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This article examines the cultural politics of hydroelectric development that citizens and 
social movements produce. Focusing on contentious and competing discourses, the text 
investigates the charge that lead activists fighting against a series of dams set along the 
Indian Himalayan reaches of the River Ganga were motivated by the self-interested pursuit of 
name recognition. Through the study of these critiques— which emerged over the course of 
an ethnographic research project spanning from 2008 to 2009—the article lends insight to an 
often-overlooked sociological phenomenon: the issue of why more people do not join dam 
opposition movements in contemporary India. 1 
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'Survival of the fittest, or in other words, 'might is right', describes India's current approach to 
dam building. The less fit—the poor, the Adivasis [tribals], the politically and economically 
weak—are being forced to pay the price of development. And the power of the fittest—the 
rich, the elite, the state machinery—is being used to extract this price, as has been the case in 




In 2007, a periodical known as Himal Southasian published a special issue on the politics of 
dam building in the Himalaya. With a subtitle that read, 'In the Shadow of the Dam: What 
Have We Learned', the special issue is representative of many debates that took place over 
previous decades, as well as in subsequent years. The submissions chronicle various cases of 
hydropolitics in South Asia as well as a number of people's movements against large dams 
that span the Himalayan regions of Bhutan, India, and Nepal. Numerous contributors lament 
that past calls for public participation in development planning, for rigorous cost-benefit 
analyses, and for post-clearance environmental monitoring have gone unheeded. Sripad 
Dharmadhikary, quoted in the above insert, points out that the price for these projects has 
often been paid by the people displaced, and the communities downstream, as well as by the 
natural environment. Offering scathing commentary, Dharmadhikary further contends:  
Even as evidence mounts against large dams, New Delhi is un-inclined to 
respond meaningfully. Perhaps this reluctance stems from the fact that part of 
the answer would be to stop building many of the proposed large dams, not to 
mention relinquishing some of its decision-making power to affected people, 
and claiming less direct control over the country's resources. As such, no real 
answers have been offered, and the authorities have instead chosen to bypass 
or ride roughshod over those who protest or propose alternatives.3 
 
                                                 
2 Shripad Dharmadhikary, 'Have River, Will Dam’, in Himal Southasian, Vol. 20, no. 9 (Lalitpur, 
Nepal: The Southasia Trust, 2007), pp. 33. 
3 Ibid. 
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 It is precisely because the marginalisation of dam opponents and activists is well 
established in existing hydropower debates that I begin with critical commentary on the 
politics of dam building. While there have been select periods of decline in the construction 
of hydroelectric projects in India,4 corporations and governmental offices continue to insist 
on building dams for reasons of flood control; for water supply transfers for agriculture, 
commerce and household use; and for electricity.5 When scholars point out the opposition to 
those projects, however, their narratives sometimes frame the politics of dam building in 
ways that pit the 'powerful' against the 'powerless'.6 Such discourses paint images of like-
minded 'communities' who ostensibly agree on the ills of particular projects, but who are 
nonetheless forced to accommodate them when government bodies insist that they must be 
built.7 Without undermining the value of dam critiques, or of the positive potential of 
people's movements,8 this article seeks to infuse the discourses that circulate about the 
politics of hydroelectric development with additional perspectives in order to move beyond 
the powerful-versus-powerless trope of dam conflict.9 These additional perspectives help us 
                                                 
4 Sanjeev Khagram, Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2004). 
5 Marcus Nusser considers the dominant dam building models to be part of Asia’s ‘technological 
hydroscapes’. See: Marcus Nüsser, ‘Technological Hydroscapes in Asia: The Large Dams Debate 
Reconsidered’, in Marcus Nüsser (ed), Large Dams in Asia: Contested Environments between 
Technological Hydroscapes and Social Resistance (New York: Springer, 2014). 
6 See, for instance: Shripad Dharmadhikary, Mountains of Concrete: Dam Building in the Himalayas 
(Berkeley, CA: International Rivers, 2008); Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, ‘Ecological 
Concerns and the Environmental Movement in India,’ in Development and Change Vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 
101-136.  
7 Some of the literature on the opposition to the dams on India’s Narmada River is framed in this way. 
See: William F. Fisher, ‘Development and Resistance in the Narmada Valley’, in Sustainable 
Development: Struggling over India’s Narmada River, William F. Fisher, ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996) pp. 3-46. Amita Baviskar and Judith Whitehead, by contrast, have crafted more 
nuanced understandings of the multiple publics and politics that were in play in the fight over dams 
along the Narmada [See: Amita Baviskar, In the Belly of the River: Tribal Conflicts over 
Development in the Narmada Valley (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Judith Whitehead, 
‘Submerged and Submerging Voices: Hegemony and the Decline of the Narmada Bachao Andolan in 
Gujarat, 1998-2001’, in Critical Asian Studies 39, no. 3 (2007), pp. 399-42.].  
8 Frances Fox Piven, Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), p. 104.  
9 In Nepal, for instance, Austin Lord demonstrates how rural Nepalis seek to profit from the 
implementation of dams through labour employment and the purchase of project-related investment 
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understand why there is also complicity with the wider project of dam building, and that this 
complicity can exist among those that view such projects unfavourably.  
 More specifically, the text examines the comments of Indian citizens who chose not 
to protest against a series of dams that were set for implementation along the highest tributary 
of the River Ganga (also known as the Ganges) in the country's northwest mountain region of 
Garhwal, Uttarakhand. I draw out these voices to add nuance to dam building debates, and to 
show that the legacy of past resource conflicts can have unexpected results that include 
public skepticism for the motivations of anti-dam activists. To make this point while drawing 
from specific examples, I explore the reception of dam opposition platforms that were 
associated with two men, Sunderlal Bahuguna and Dr. G.D. Agarwal (now known as Swami 
Gyanswaroop Sansand), who opposed the construction of distinct dams on a tributary of the 
Ganga known as the Bhagirathi. This content, and the critiques of their activism, is presented 
to provoke contemplation and to build a more robust presentation of the competing 
discourses circulated by citizens and social movement actors.10 I round out this conversation 
with commentary on the role of Gandhian style platforms in contemporary movements, and 
the fragility of alliances made between high-profile activists and mountain residents.  
 While focusing on specific discourses that deserve attention, this article looks at the 
charge made by several of my interlocutors that lead activists fighting against the dams were 
motivated by the self-interested pursuit of notoriety. These leaders were, to state it more 
directly, accused of 'seeking fame' and of trying to promote their own 'name and fame'. 
Through the exploration of these critiques— which emerged over the course of an 
ethnographic research project that spanned the years of 2008–2009 with follow up visits in 
                                                 
shares. See: Austin Lord, ‘Citizens of a Hydropower Nation: Territory and Agency at the Frontiers of 
Hydropower Development in Nepal, in Economic Anthropology, Vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 145-160.   
10 The exploration of social movement discord is inspired by the insightful work of Wendy Wolford 
[This Land is Ours Now: Social Moblization and the Meanings of Land in Brazil (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2010)].  
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2012 and 2014—the article endeavors to explain a sociological phenomenon of significant 
importance: the issue of why people choose not to join opposition movements to contest dam 
building in contemporary India. The exploration of why some people refrain from protesting 
certain dam projects amplifies our understandings of the cultural politics of hydroelectric 
development that citizens, activists, and social movements produce. This effort also builds 
upon the insights of scholars who look at leadership struggles in India’s everyday democratic 
politics.11 Such scholars argue that it is important to examine, ‘the actions, ideas, and values 
of people who wield power and (who) influence the various types of political spheres that are 
to be found in the subcontinent’, but who have perhaps not typically been given adequate 
consideration as political actors.12  
 
Resource Conflict Through the Prism of Cultural Politics  
Cultural politics is a pertinent framework for the following discussion because it includes the 
processes enacted when sets of social actors shaped by, and embodying, different cultural 
meanings and practices come into conflict with one another.13 In a cultural politics 
formulation, ‘culture’ is a ‘site of contestation’ that includes social inequities and relations of 
power as well as ideas of ‘identity, community, and territory’.14 When applied to the study of 
resource conflicts, a cultural politics lens involves looking at contending discourses, resource 
values, and visions of an improved social and ecological world. In looking at the realms of 
action and critique associated with cultural politics, existing scholarship suggests that civil 
                                                 
11 Arild Engelsen Ruud and Pamela Price, ‘Introduction’, in Arild Engelsen Ruud and Pamela Price 
(eds), Power and Influence in India: Bosses, Lords, and Captains (New Delhi: Routledge, 2010), pp. 
xix-xxxiv.  
12 Ibid., pp. xxi 
13 Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar, 'Introduction: The Cultural and the Political 
in Latin American Social Movements', in Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, and Arturo Escobar (eds), 
Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1998.), pp. 7. 
14 Donald S. Moore, ‘The Crucible of Cultural Politics: Reworking “Development” in Zimbabwe’s 
Eastern Highlands’, in American Ethnologist Vol. 26, no. 3, p. 656. 
 7 
society actors and social movement participants are key producers of cultural politics because 
they often attempt to upset a dominant socio-cultural order with meanings and practices that 
are marginal, oppositional, residual, emergent, and alternative. As Charles Kurzman writes 
‘... social movements may be a particularly conducive site to privilege meaning-making, 
because their activities foreground resistance to the dominant norms and institutions of 
society’.15  
 Collective acts of resistance, however, do not mean that all social movements are 
inherently democratic or 'emancipatory' in their internal processes. The tensions that persist 
among social movements can be significant, and the study of these tensions can further 
illuminate the cultural politics of the resource conflicts in play. Recognizing the multiple 
repertoires of resistance in which social movements are engaged, Donna L. Chollett asks us 
to consider cultural politics as a ‘dialectical process’ wherein cultural meanings and activities 
reshape taken for granted understandings within a context of unequal access to power (297). 
Her work includes the inequalities that operate within social movements, which is a stance 
that ultimately challenges assumptions about the ‘virtuousness’ of social movements.16  
 Also operating within the cultural politics of social movements is the issue of how 
they, and the issues around which they organise, are presented. This can be especially true 
when social movements fight to defend water, land, and forests from degradation and 
extraction due to a range of cultural, religious, and ecological reasons. It is for this reason 
that Amita Baviskar warns: 'The politics of naming movements as “environmental” or 
otherwise is not settled quite so easily... the representation of social movements as 
"environmentalist" emerges from a discursive encounter between different groups within the 
                                                 
15 Charles Kurzman, 'Meaning Making in Social Movements', in Anthropological Quarterly Vol. 81, 
no. 1 (2008), pp. 6. 
16 Donna L. Chollett, ‘”Like an Ox Yoke”: Challenging the Intrinsic Virtuousness of a Grassroots 
Social Movement’, in Critique of Anthropology Vol. 31, no. 4 (2011), pp. 293-311. 
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movement and their supporters. The multiple contending meanings that different groups 
bring to the terrain of struggle are negotiated and new understandings created in an ongoing 
process of dialogue between unequally situated actors’.17 These observations foreshadow the 
discussion of movement politics and power struggles that come to the fore when discussing 
the legacies of two activist men.  
 Before moving on to the main text, it bears noting that in the backdrop of the cultural 
politics to be explored are the discursive constructions and circulations of value-laden notions 
of 'development'.18 This requires additional attention to the cultural politics of development; 
such an approach involves examining the ‘micro-politics’ through which ‘global 
development discourses are refracted, reworked, and sometimes subverted in particular 
locales’.19 In India, dams are part and parcel of discursively potent development agenda that 
has advanced since the middle of the twentieth century. Although often unpopular for the 
communities living in project affected zones, dams have been pursued as a development 
strategy by colonial and post-colonial Indian governments as well as by international 
organsations such as the World Bank. The early dam building arguments that came out of the 
office of the first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, famously framed hydroelectric 
development as nearly synonymous with the nation's 'progress'. Such narratives were set 
amid budding desires to escape the category of 'underdevelopment' and enter into the 
category of 'developing' or 'developed'.20 As Akhil Gupta writes in his book, Postmodern 
                                                 
17 Amita Baviskar, ‘Red in Tooth and Claw? Looking for Class in Struggles over Nature’, in Raka 
Ray and Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (eds), Social Movements in India: Poverty, Power, and Politics 
(Lanhma, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp. 164-165.  
18 Stacy Leigh Pigg offers a seminal discussion of subjective notions of development—and the desire 
for being ‘developed’—in her article, ‘Inventing Social Categories through Place: Social 
Representations and Development in Nepal’ [in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 34, 
no. 3 (1992), pp. 491-513.].  
19 Moore, ‘The Crucible of Cultural Politics’, p. 655.  
20 David Ludden, 'India's Development Regime', in Nicholas B Dirks (ed), Colonialism and Culture, 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992) p. 247; See also: Arturo Escobar, Encountering 
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995).  
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Developments, it was particularly the repeated reminder that India was not-yet developed that 
had an effect on how Indians saw themselves. He argues: '...to be a national subject in an 
'underdevelopment country'—for example, to be a citizen of India—is to occupy an 
overdetermined subject position interpellated by discourses of the nation and [original 
emphasis] the discourses of development to which that nation is subjected.' 21 To state it 
otherwise, the discourses used to promote and validate dams in India operate as powerful 
factors shaping the cultural politics of hydroelectric dam building.  
  
Movement Tensions and Subtexts of Social Discord 
  
When I first began visiting Garhwal in 2004 to make inquiries about the impact of dam 
building on the region, the government's emphasis on development was a concern that 
several interlocutors initially flagged when explaining that 'that there is no use' in opposing 
hydroelectric projects already decided upon by the state. Over subsequent years, interlocutors 
gave further commentary that ranged from, 'There is no point in resisting,' to, 'You can't fight 
the government.' Numerous examples of highly contentious development projects from the 
past were given as evidence of this; disputed dams on the religiously revered Narmada and 
Ganga rivers, for instance, had ultimately gone ahead despite decades of social movement 
protest. This produced skepticism that politicians would have their way regardless of the 
efforts that citizens might enact to oppose particular projects.  
 Suggestions that social movement campaigns were (and are) pointless can be a great 
source of consternation to those that take the time and energy to contest hydroelectric 
development. This was particularly evident in the effort to oppose three specific dams of 350, 
416, and 600 Megawatts that were in various stages of implementation or construction from 
2006–2010 in the mountains of Uttarakhand State. These dams—Bhaironghati Phase I & II, 
                                                 
21 Akhil Gupta, Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1998), p. 41. 
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Loharinag Pala, and Pala Maneri—were meant to direct water out of the Bhagirathi, a main 
tributary of the River Ganga that flows from a protected glacial source at Gaumukh.22 
Activists involved in a series of occasionally overlapping social movement campaigns (some 
of which were organised by mountain residents, others of which were organised by plains-
based residents visiting the mountains for short visits) were motivated in part by the 
ecological impacts that these medium sized diversion dams threatened to cause due to the 
drilling and blasting of the tunnels needed to create an underground slope severe enough to 
generate electricity.2324 Many of the activists who joined in the ebb and flow of dam 
opposition campaigns also cited their concerns about the cultural and religious implications 
of building dams on the last unobstructed and freely flowing stretch of the Ganga—an entity 
revered by Hindus as a source of spiritual purification and a symbol of Hindu faith. Since the 
construction of these projects entailed extensive dynamite blasting and drilling in order to 
build the tunnels designed to redirect water out of the river's main flow, river devotees 
worried that the very essence and divine power (shakti) of the Goddess Ganga would be 
diminished because only freely-flowing (aviral) water is considered holy and pure (nirmal).  
 The relative proximity of these dams to the Ganga's glacial source and to a 
downstream temple town and pilgrimage destination at Gangotri was further invoked to 
frame the opposition as an appeal to protect the cultural and religious sentiments of self-
identified Hindus. A spot near the Gangotri temple is where the Goddess Ganga (who 
embodies the River Ganga and imbues it with her divine grace) is believed to have fallen 
from heaven. These histories solidify the temple as a major pilgrimage destination for 
devotees seeking to gain the Ganga's divine blessings.  
                                                 
22 When mentioning this tributary, residents call it the 'Ganga' rather than the 'Bhagirathi'. 
23 Once electricity is produced and put into the power grid, the water is released back into the riverbed 
(as opposed to it being used for irrigation or to augment the water supply). 
24 Displacement was not a primary concern as the land and residence loss of diversion dams is 
nominal compared to the impact of reservoir dams.   
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 Because the dams were set for implementation just a few dozen kilometres 
downstream from Gangotri, opponents asserted that the government-approved projects were 
an insult to the Goddess embodied by the waters, and a move that showed insensitivity to the 
reverence that Hindus hold for the river. A main reason for this assertion was that, once 
completed, the tunnels attached to the diversion dams would force the Ganga out of its 
riverbed for long stretches and away from the loving gaze and touch of devotees.25 At a 
regional level, this would hamper the ability of Hindus to access the culturally and religiously 
important waters needed to sanctify ritual acts. At a national level, some worried that the 
damming of the last freely-flowing stretches of the Ganga would serve as a final act of 
disrespect to a river that is extensively manipulated and heavily polluted.  
 In response to range of cultural, religious, and ecological concerns evoked by the 
three dam projects, some of the residents of Garhwal banded together to raise awareness. 
Many others—many millions of others—did not. This caused a point of confusion, and 
reflection. Why wasn't there a mass movement to stop the final three dams on the last freely 
flowing section of what is arguably India’s most iconic river? When I tried to pose this 
question to dam opponents who gathered for a rally that was not well attended (see Figure 1 
below), one interlocutor replied sharply, 'Because they are hypocrites.' When asked for 
clarification, she explained her opinion that any self-labeled Hindu who does not rise to 
defend the Ganga against desecration is hypocritical; the mandates of their faith should 
compel them to action. Another interlocutor explained away the lack of civil society action to 
stop dams on the Ganga by saying that Indian citizens have become ‘too passive’ and ‘too 
                                                 
25 The intense desire of devotees to be by the Ganga's side is made especially public when millions 
gather in one of the world's best organized mass events during the auspicious period known as kumbh 
mela [See, for instance: Kama Maclean, Pilgrimage and Power: The Kumbh Mela in Allahabad 1765-
1954 (Madison: Oxford University Press, 2008).].  
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materialistic’ to take the action needed to protect the river.  Others reflected that Indians have 
become 'too secular', and thus less inclined to stand up for the sacred river's defense.  
 
 
Figure 1: A ‘Save the Ganga’ Rally in Rishikesh, India 
Photo by Author, February 2009 
 
 
 Over the course of interviews starting in 2008, but which grew in number as the dam 
opposition movements gained visibility in 2009 and 2010, residents of the region where these 
dams were set for construction claimed that it was many of the activists who were, in fact, 
'hypocritical'. Many of these interlocutors minced no words in saying that they looked upon 
the social movement campaigners with suspicion. In the crosshairs of such critiques were the 
lead activists, the ones in the limelight. These leaders were described by numerous 
interlocutors as motivated by a pursuit of their own brand recognition and notoriety.26  
 
'Fame-Seeking Activists' and Leadership Critiques 
Within the movements, it became evident over time that as people went about the work of 
identifying the most effective way to 'frame' the issues and opposition campaigns,27 they 
were also trying to ascertain who was in the fight to defend the Ganga for the ‘right’ (or 
unselfish) reasons and who, by contrast, was involved for the purpose of ego gratification and 
perhaps personal gain. The research uncovered a persistent concern that some people were 
involved in the effort to stop dams on the Ganga in order to promote their own ‘name and 
fame’. The wording meant to indicate that certain people desired to increase their own 
notoriety and prestige by serving as visible movement leaders. This accusation, often posed 
                                                 
26 The less prominent citizens who joined the rallies and marches were forgiven by such critics for 
being followers compelled by their love (prem) for the River Ganga and its Goddess.  
27 Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment', in Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000), pp. 611-639. 
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in English even among Hindi speakers, carried significant weight. It was a very serious 
charge, as was the assertion that certain people took part in the campaigns to ‘enlarge one’s 
own name’ (apna naam badaane ke liyee). Over time, the name and fame trope became an 
important point of investigation not just because of the internal divisions it revealed, but also 
because of the resource politics that it had the potential to illuminate.  
 A chance exchange was particularly revealing of the distrust that some people 
expressed. It took place when I was making a routine visit to two ardent Ganga devotees who 
run a medical clinic in Uttarkashi, a district capital located just a few dozen miles 
downstream from the dam construction sites. On a sunny day in August of 2009, I found the 
couple at their medical shop in Uttarkashi's main market. As I entered and sat down next to a 
man wearing simple orange robes, I discovered that the pair were in the middle of an 
animated exchange with the Hindu ascetic. The husband, a doctor, was complaining to the 
man in robes about a certain movement leader who was trying to get him involved in the dam 
opposition. He lamented, ‘They are playing a political game. Whoever gets in the middle will 
get swallowed.’ Elaborating on his concerns, the doctor suggested that such people, if they 
truly want to help the Ganga, should just focus on singing God's praises and doing their 
meditation. ‘Yeah’, said his wife, who had already added several points of supporting 
commentary during this exchange, ‘just worship God.’ Whereas the doctor cautioned against 
the politics behind the dam opposition, her comments were meant to remind us that it is the 
primary duty of Hindus to treat the Ganga with devotion. If politics have soured the river's 
treatment, then the argument was to double one's personal efforts to selflessly serve the 
divine entity within those waters while remaining above the political fray. These comments 
were especially interesting because this couple had previously expressed dismay at the river’s 
treatment and the scope of the development activities that had, in their eyes, lead the river to 
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ruin.28 They wanted to see the river looking healthy and running free, and they worried about 
the region’s future prospects if the Ganga was further impaired.   
 In his response to the couple’s statements, I expected that the renunciant would object 
and say that it was precisely because of the river's importance to Hindus that they have a 
religious duty to protect the Ganga from dams, regardless of the wider politics. Instead, he 
offered slowly spoken commentary that supported the criticisms of my two interlocutors. 
‘The general public’, he began, ‘is of the opinion that these [people and] organizations 
working in the name of Ganga... they think that they just want money, (and) that is why they 
protest.’ He then immediately drew upon a past movement legacy, the fight against a 
downstream project known as the Tehri dam. The leader of that movement—Sunderlal 
Bahuguna—was named as someone whose primary aim was notoriety and financial gain. The 
renunciant contended that this man, a person that I will introduce later while defending his 
track record, was the first to protest against the Tehri dam and that he was also the first man 
to take rewards from the government on the condition that he would stop protesting. ‘When 
his money would run out’, claimed the renunciant, ‘he would go back and sit down on strike. 
When he got money again, he would keep quiet. So that is how it goes. There are many such 
examples.’ The husband and wife agreed, lamenting that such people could not be trusted. 
Nodding as he stood to purchase his medicine, the renunciant emphasised that the problem is 
that movement leaders ‘do not have the support of the general public.’  
 These comments were not isolated to this one exchange. During the main period of 
fieldwork from 2008–2009, I encountered numerous conversations that echoed the 
sentiments expressed. Some of my interlocutors even encouraged me to disregard the 
                                                 
28 The doctor even said, in a different one-on-one exchange, that the Ganga’s waters were lamentably 
‘dead’ because they were no longer flowing freely most of the year due to already existing projects. 
He complained that these projects were poorly implemented and that, “The politicians ate all the 
money” (and were/are corrupt).  
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movement leaders I was speaking with and ethnographically shadowing, as they were ‘only 
politicians’ using the call to save the Ganga to advance personal agendas. But as one 
interlocutor said with a disheartened laugh, at least with politicians you know they are 
corrupt; the high-profile activists, by contrast, hide behind a discourse of selflessness that 
obscures their 'real' motivations (which he saw as the pursuit of fame and notoriety). In the 
view of these critics, the issue of dam building on a culturally and religiously revered river 
was more akin to the backdrop of a drama than it was the main point around which the drama 
revolved. The name-calling and instances of critique were often based on memories of 
misrepresentations, exclusions, and power ‘abuses’ by notable movement leaders whose past 
actions continue to impact upon present expressions of skepticism and distrust.  
 The role of the past in the present speaks to concerns of memory and how it operates 
in movement processes. The literature on social movements evidences a growing engagement 
with memory and what some call ‘memory movements’, which are efforts to revive 
collective memory and increase attention to past incidents (and the actions of key 
individuals) in order to challenge the authority of prevailing understandings.29 Also important 
are the insidious ways that memories of campaigns past can destabilise, as well as strengthen, 
contemporary efforts.30 Where they are most capable of destabilization is when they are 
charged with anger over recollections of past injustices done, not just at the hands of 
policymakers, but by the very movement leaders in whom trust was given.  
 It is for the above reasons that the critique of Sunderlal Bahuguna's work and legacy 
merits discussion. Sunderlal (as he is commonly called) is the man that the earlier quoted 
                                                 
29 Raj Andrew Ghoshal, 'Transforming Collective Memory: Mnemonic Opportunity Structures and 
the Outcomes of Racial Violence in Memory Movements', in Theory and Society, Vol. 42, no. 4 
(2013), pp. 339-350. 
30 This is not to say that memories of prior movement conflicts are accurate, static, or unproblematic. 
Memory, particularly as it is passed on to others, is continually constructed and reconstructed [Pierre 
Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', in Representations 26 (1989), pp. 7-
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renunciant criticised when speaking against distrustful movement leaders. I note at the outset 
that the renunciant's claims were likely unfounded. Sunderlal has an impressive track record 
as a social reformer and activist. He dedicated himself to improving the lives of the poor and 
marginalised and is a model of self-sacrifice for many activists and scholars.31 The praise that 
exists for Sunderlal nationally and internationally, in fact, is likely to far exceed the criticisms 
about his activism. Yet, those criticisms do persist. Scholars such as Haripriya Rangan 
caution, for instance, that there is a good deal of myth making that goes into the national and 
international presentations of 'environmental' movements in the Himalayas, as well as the 
role of high-profile activists such as Sunderlal.32 Rangan adds that the narratives of 
Sunderlal's service and sacrifice have 'enhanced his public image as a charismatic saviour of 
the Himalayas, and the authentic voice of its common folk'.33 Antje Linkenbach similarly 
asks for us to consider the legacies of post-movement politics in her portrayal of the 
dissatisfactions that mountain villagers express about leaders like Sunderlal.34 She quotes 
villagers who lament that Sunderlal did not evenly share the recognition and monetary gains 
of the awards that he received for the activism in which many Garhwalis participated.35 
 In the interest of refraining from the promulgation of myths, and the idealisation of 
movement leaders, it is only fair that I explore in some depth the charges laid against 
Sunderlal Bahuguna for his role in past dam oppositions. This content is not meant to tarnish 
his reputation but to point out the long-term implications of the kinds of activism with which 
he is associated. I stress here that there is relevance beyond the current case at hand. Alpa 
                                                 
31 George Alfred James, Ecology is Permanent Economy: The Activism and Environmental 
Philosophy of Sunderlal Bahuguna (Albany: State University of New York, 2013). 
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33 Ibid., p.31. 
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Shah, in her book on indigenous livelihoods and conservation politics in Jharkhand, India, 
explores similar tensions to speak to issues of voice and representation.36 In this work, she 
asks: ‘Are the organised battles [over which activists fight] equally valuable for all those on 
whose behalf they are allegedly fought?’37 A part of this is the issue of inclusion amongst and 
between indigenous activists. Through her ethnography, she shows that the opinions, desires, 
and concerns of the poorest rural indigenous actors, ‘contradicted and subverted those of the 
well-meaning urban-based middle-class activists, as well as those of the rural elites aspiring 
to rise up the class hierarchy.38 She points to these challenges while drawing from Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak39 to demonstrate the possibility that activist intellectuals are 
unknowingly complicit in the task of further marginalizing the people for whom they claim to 
speak.40 It is in the wider spirit of exploring these questions that I study Sunderlal’s efforts.  
 
Sunderlal Bahuguna's Legacy: Memories of the Tehri Dam Movement 
It was Sunderlal's efforts to stop the construction of Tehri dam on the Ganga’s Bhagirathi 
tributary in the 1980's and 1990's that animated the critique provided earlier by the couple 
and the renunciant. Recall that the renunciant lamented the following: ‘He was the first to 
protest and he was the first man to take rewards from the government. When his money 
would run out, he would go back and sit down on strike.’ Here, the renunciant is speaking to 
the years of stop-and-start protests in which Bahuguna was the lead campaigner. His main 
                                                 
36 Alpa Shah, In the Shadows of the State: Indigenous Activism, Environmentalism, and Insurgency in 
Jharkhand, India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).  
37 ibid., p. 25. 
38 ibid. p., 11. 
39 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?' in Cary Nelso and Lawrence Grossberg 
(eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 
pp. 271-313. 
40 Shah, In the Shadows of the State, pp. 25. 
 18 
tactic of protest was the fast-unto-death. In fact, claims Mukul Sharma,41 Sunderlal 
Bahuguna's fasts in 1992, 1995, 1997, and 2001 were the main rallying points for the 
opposition to the Tehri dam.42 At issue were a suite of concerns that the large dam would 
drown out a historic town, submerge over 100 villages, displace some 100,000 residents, and 
harm the Goddess Ganga who needs free-flowing water to remain healthy and ritually pure. 
 While Bahuguna had the wellbeing of the residents of the to-be-submerged Tehri 
township at heart,43 the concern for the Goddess Ganga's health and purity seemed an 
especially important point of motivation. Although the issue of equitable development was 
on his mind, in other words, he also worried about protecting the Ganga and its wider 
Himalayan landscape for reasons of cultural and religious continuity. In an interview with 
David Haberman, Sunderalal characterized the battle over the Tehri dam as a fight between 
‘good and evil’ (wherein ‘evil’ is the unchecked destructive force of modernisation).44 His 
opposition efforts were hence framed as an upstanding moral response to the dangers that the 
dam symbolised. The use of the fast-unto-death was helpful in conveying this perspective. As 
Mukul Sharma explains, Bahuguna viewed the fasts as a righteous (satvik) protest tactic that 
was capable of garnering public and media attention.45 The method was developed by 
ascetics of generations past who sought knowledge of the inner self (aatma gyan) through 
various types of penance and sacrifice (tapasya). As a protest tactic, it was picked up and 
                                                 
41  Mukul Sharma, 'Passages from Nature to Nationalism: Sunderlal Bahuguna and Tehri Dam 
Opposition in Garhwal', in Political and Economic Weekly, 12 February, Vol. XLIV, no. 8 (2009), pp. 
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42 ibid., p. 118. 
43 James, Ecology is Permanent Economy, pp. 171-204.  
44 David L Haberman, River of Love in an Age of Pollution: The Yamuna River of Northern India 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p. 72. 
45 As Amita Bhaviskar, Emma Mawdsley and Mukul Sharma note, the religiously charged discourse 
that Sunderlal used overlapped with the language and politics of conservative Hindu organisations 
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popularised by Mohandas Gandhi. When Gandhi fasted for a particular cause, such as to 
overturn colonial policies or to stop communal violence, people were forced to revise their 
positions as he neared death after weeks without nourishment. In building upon the model set 
by Mohandas Gandhi, Sunderlal made appeals against the unchecked development of the 
Himalaya that called for small-scale and 'alternative' development models.46  
 While Gandhi's fasting tactics have influenced generations of social movements 
across the political spectrum, those tactics are not without critique.47 The founder of an NGO 
promoting sustainable development and economic prosperity in the region is one such critic. 
As he commented during our interview in July of 2008, Sunderlal's past actions in opposition 
to the by-then completed Tehri dam may have ‘created damage’ because his fasts appeared to 
some to be motivated by a desire to be seen and known more than they were efforts taken in a 
selfless pursuit of environmental sustainability and religious duty. What is more, this critic 
charged that Sunderlal's fasts, and the demands that he put forth while enduring those fasts, 
imposed a distinct vision of small-scale, 'Gandhian-type' development upon the Garhwal 
Himalaya. Such critics charge that his calls for forest preservation over the expansion of 
industrial activity did not always match what villagers envisioned for the future of the region 
in which they lived. In dictating to others what was at stake in the dam construction, the 
NGO interlocutor claimed that Sunderlal was unable to listen to the multiple stakeholders 
around him that had ‘varying visions’ of mountain development, and nuanced arguments for 
and against the Tehri dam.48  
                                                 
46 Other sources of inspiration for Sunderlal include Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. 
47 For critiques of how activists such as Anna Hazare have used the fasting tactic in the early twenty-
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Vol. 71, no. 3 (2012), pp. 593-601; Aradhana Sharma, 'Epic Fasts and Shallow Spectacles: The "India 
Against Corruption" Movement, its Critics, and the Re-Making of "Gandhi"', in South Asia: Journal 
of South Asian Studies, Vol. 37, no. 3 (2014), pp. 365-380. 
48 Sharma, Green and Saffron, p. 118. These tensions show how movement recollections are fluid 
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 Beyond the discursive critiques of Sunderlal's fasts, the packaging of his opposition 
tactics also points to the challenge of channeling Mohandas Gandhi for contemporary 
protests in India. As Aradhana Sharma and others comment,49 Gandhi had a particular moral 
authority to resist British colonial rule (and to promote self dependence and passive 
resistance, or swadeshi and satyagraha) via his one-man platforms. Those who apply 
Gandhi's methods to contemporary activist tactics oftentimes lack that same authority, and 
many of them refashion his platform while overlooking the ambivalences and controversies 
that marked Gandhi's protest strategies, as well as other parts of his life. Due to this selective 
refashioning, writes A. Sharma, the critics of Gandhi-inspired campaigns are more easily able 
to dismiss activists that have, 'discursively produced Gandhi as an immutable relic with an 
ossified and... worn-out ideology".50 They are also able to claim that the contemporary 
movements are 'undemocratic'—a charge that will be laid out with more explanation in the 
second profile of activism featured in the following section.  
 What is important to note here is that the memories of Sunderlal's actions, real or 
imagined, are influential for the discourses and reactions that people produce. In particular, 
they serve as evidence for the past subtexts of social discord that shape the cultural politics of 
protest movements against dams on the upper reaches of the Ganga's flow. This discord, I 
argue, continued when three new dams, mentioned earlier, were in the beginning stages of 
implementation in locations above the completed Tehri dam. When opposition to those three 
dams arose in the early twenty-first century, it was not Sunderlal Bahuguna but Dr. G.D. 
Agarwal that took a prominent public role.51 Whereas Bahuguna’s legacy may have 
                                                 
49 Sharma, 'Epic Fasts and Shallow Spectacles’, pp. 365-380. See also: William Mazzarella, 'Branding 
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predisposed some people to distrust Dr. Agarwal, it was the particularities of Dr. Agarwal's 
campaigns that added to their criticisms. His tactics merit explanation as they may eventually 
feed into new repertoires of critique and distrust that impact movement processes.  
 
  
Dr. G. D. Agarwal and the Politics of the Fast-Unto-Death 
 
A former professor at the prestigious I.I.T. Kanpur, G.D. Agarwal held the name recognition 
and social status that was able to capture the attention of the media and the public when he 
chose to oppose the Bhaironghati, Loharinag Pala, and Pala Maneri dams. Like Sunderlal, Dr. 
Agarwal blended Gandhi-inspired protest strategies with discourses in which he positioned 
himself as a defender of Hindu ‘culture’ and ‘faith’. He did this while capitalizing on his 
authority as a technical expert whose religious convictions outweighed the scientific 
influence of his professional training. In his statements, for instance, Dr. Agarwal argued that 
the damming of the last free-flowing stretches of the Ganga threatened the stability of Hindu 
cultural practices. This, he worried, threatened the very fabric of Hinduism. Conflating the 
wellbeing of Hinduism with the wellbeing of the nation, he argued that the effort to save the 
Ganga's Himalayan flow was effectively an effort to ‘save India’.52 Dr. Agarwal's comments 
help to further illuminate the cultural and religious drivers of the conflict.  
 Not surprisingly, Dr. Agarwal’s main opposition tactic was the use of several fast-
unto-death campaigns, which ranged from 15 to 38 days. He began his first fast in the 
Garhwali district capital of Uttarkashi in 2008, although he later moved this protest to New 
Delhi. Additional fasts were launched from the Indian plains in 2009 and 2010 and each 
received media and government attention. The third fast in 2010 ended with much fanfare 
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after Indian government officials promised to Dr. Agarwal that they would cancel the three 
contested dams. They also conceded to a demand that the government create an Ecologically 
Sensitive Zone (Eco-Zone) in the region where the three contested dams were being built. 
Ultimately, the Eco-Zone was officially declared, via a governmental 'notification', in 
December of 2012. The notification specifies that a 100-kilometre stretch of the River 
Bhagirathi flowing from the glacial source at Gaumukh will be protected under a series of 
guidelines that limit development to mitigate the 'anthropogenic pressure on ecosystems 
(and) the environment'.53 The mandates of the Eco-Zone required initial public consultation 
'with local people (and) particularly women' but controversy persists over the extent to which 
this has taken place.54 As a result, several aspects of the Eco-Zone went under review for 
potential 'tweaks' demanded by impacted residents, as well as by state government officials, 
who view the conservation zone as a deterrent to economic opportunity and a burdensome 
restriction on the state's development.5556 
 Even before the controversies over the Eco-Zone implementation had come to the 
fore, many interlocutors living in Garhwal critiqued Dr. Agarwal's fasts-unto-death tactic, 
which placed him front-and-centre in the public eye as the main dam objector. Instead of 
unwavering praise, what often arose in the Garhwal-based conversations I observed was a 
concern that most of Dr. Agarwal's fasts were conducted in the Indian plains rather than in 
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the Himalaya where the dams were being built. For some of the skeptics living in the 
mountains, this belied Dr. Agarwal’s status as an ‘outsider’ who had no right to meddle in the 
management of the river’s flow in Garhwal. Some pointed to the years he spent as a professor 
in Kanpur to say that, if he was really worried about the Ganga, he should have worked to 
save the river from the high levels of pollution visibly choking the river in that industrial city. 
Such interlocutors found it suspect that he would choose to campaign against the 
management of a Himalayan stretch of the river with which he had little embodied 
experience relative to that of long-term residents.  
 The accusation that Dr. Agarwal was an outsider enabled people to speculate that he 
was more concerned with enhancing his own name recognition than with helping mountain 
people fight unchecked development processes. If his motivations were otherwise, several of 
my interlocutors contended, then he would have worked more to capacitate the mountain 
residents concerned about the dams. This is why an interlocutor with experience working on 
social issues in the Garhwal mountains later claimed the great weakness of Dr. Agarwal's 
‘brand of movement’ was that it was not connected to the ‘local movements’. As additional 
commenters pointed out, the disconnection between his one-man platform and the desires and 
struggles of people who live in the Himalayas meant that his brand of activism was 
essentially ‘undemocratic’. Here again, we see the overtones of the wider critique for protest 
platforms that draw from the model that Mohandas Gandhi laid out. These critiques are 
particularly strong when they are in response to the fast-unto-death tactic that people such as 
Dr. Agarwal employ. In a different case that the aforementioned Aradhana Sharma lays out, 
one observer of a hunger strike (performed by Anna Hazare) likened it to a 'suicide bombing 
in slow motion' and a form of 'violent coercion [that] can never nourish democracy'.57 
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 While these critiques might seem trivial or he-said-she-said in nature, they can 
influence public opinion in a way that has long-term implications. In a telling turn of events, 
a number of pro-dam movements arose from 2010 onwards in response to Dr. Agarwal's 
campaigns. Some of their actions demonstrated the highly emotional character of the conflict. 
For instance, when the former professor tried to expand his campaign in 2012 to stop 
additional dams planned for construction on the Alaknanda River, which also feeds into the 
Ganga’s Himalayan flow, he was met by angry protestors who defended their right to 
‘development’ (vikaas). At the time, Dr. Agarwal had taken sanyasin vows and could now 
claim the status of a Hindu Swami. Despite his elevated status, when he attempted to visit the 
dam building area for an alleged protest (dharna), his caravan was attacked by a mob of 
protesters who criticised him for inciting anti-development, ‘anti-Uttarakhand’, and ‘anti-
India’ sentiments. The dam activists reportedly hurled shoes at his vehicle and chased him 
down the mountain for nearly 20 miles.58 In the same news report that documented the shoe 
throwing, Mr. Rajendra Singh—often referred to as India’s ‘waterman’ for his prominent 
work on rainwater harvesting in Rajasthan—claimed that the accosters were backed by the 
dam construction company and by political interests. 59 While there might be truth to that, the 
point of leverage was nonetheless the distrust and skepticism of outsiders who meddle in the 
region's development trajectory, leaving little room for the inclusion of mountain residents. 
Also at issue was the concern for mountain-based employment. As Mantri Prasad Naithani of 
the Congress Party stated, ‘The Ganga and its tributaries are sacred for all and their sanctity 
would remain even after making the dams.’ He added: ‘The power projects will lead to 
numerous avenues of direct and indirect employment for the poor hill masses’.60 
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 Around the same period in 2012, protest movements reemerged in the region where 
the three dams were canceled—but this time they were predominantly in favor of restarting 
work on the canceled dams. The bulk of those publicly calling for the reopening of the 
projects were the labourers, contractors, and shop owners that previously clashed with the 
dam opposition movements. Employment concerns were again high on the list of the 
grievances made by dam proponents since a subset of the population hoped to work on the 
dam constructions as wage earners. On return visits to Uttarkashi in 2012 and 2014, I even 
observed that some of the people who once campaigned against the dams had changed their 
opinion and were now dam proponents. Some of these interlocutors said they felt cheated by 
how their concerns for the Ganga's wellbeing were hijacked for use in a one-man show that 
resulted in not just dam cancelations but also the creation of an Eco-Zone that would ban a 
wide gamut of riverside development activities, and about which there was little consultation.  
 While a number of stalwart dam opponents continued to back Dr. Agarwal and his 
campaigns, others lamented that such people could not be trusted. One such interlocutor was 
a woman who I knew to be highly involved in the mountain-based efforts to oppose the 
dams. When they were finally canceled and Dr. Agarwal was credited with this ‘win’, she felt 
that her substantial sacrifice of time and energy was overlooked. As a result, she promised to 
refrain from all future movement activity—even if the dam cancellations were to one day be 
reversed. These stances serve as a reminder of the ways that contested activist tactics feed 
into the cultural politics of hydroelectric development in India, as well as why the negative 
assessment of activists' personal motivations can lead people who express deep affection and 
concern for the Ganga to abstain, and even withdraw, from social movement campaigns.   
                                                 





‘Name and Fame’ and The Cultural Politics of Social Movements Revisited 
     
This text offered an expanded discussion of the varied reactions that citizens demonstrate in 
response to Himalayan hydropower conflicts. While we should have full sympathy for, and 
even express outrage at, the ways that hydroelectric projects are being pushed upon 
'communities' of people living in the mountains of the Himalaya, we also need to examine the 
inter- and intra-community tensions that emerge as people make sense of these projects. This 
includes their appraisals of whether or not these projects can viably be contested, and 
whether or not those efforts at contestation might be harnessed by a select few for their own 
personal or political motivations. If and when those appraisals lead people to calculate that it 
is best to abstain from engaging in protest, then there is also an obligation to examine the 
ways that this might reflect a more savvy perspective on hydropower conflicts than might 
otherwise be presumed. Part of this savvy might also be an understanding that the social 
movements inspired by hydropower conflicts can result in mixed outcomes when the 
movement participants have divergent motivations and diverse understandings of what is at 
stake. This points to the hidden subtexts of distrust and skepticism that help explain why 
Indian citizens do not stand behind high-profile movement leaders more often, as well as why 
some citizens end up changing their opinions on the value of Himalayan dam building.  
 Given the concern expressed by those who did not join the dam oppositions, it 
appears that the inclination to praise the lone upper-caste activist influenced by Gandhian 
tactics and ideals is one that merits caution. While notable scholarship does show how 
Mohandas Gandhi’s legacy influences contemporary movements in ways that might enable 
broad-based campaigns,61 others have indicated that a similar source of inspiration can lead 
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to misrepresentation when the focus is put on a single movement leader.62 Maintaining an 
emphasis on the cultural politics operating within movements is, therefore, a way to add 
nuance to the analyses produced. Such efforts involve looking at ‘the articulation of 
struggles’ that are ‘simultaneously material and symbolic’.63 Also at issue in these cultural 
politics is the questionable use of polarizing discourses, and of attempts to elevate past 
‘traditions’ that have served to keep some people marginalised while others have fared 
somewhat better. A move to include more attention to the cultural politics of activism may 
ultimately invite more debate within the social movements that are influenced by a Gandhian 
activist model that places a lone campaigner—often a man of mature years and high social 
standing—front and centre. This is significant as the discursive tensions itemised in this text 
indicate the potential, and the desire, for more democratic and representative means of civic 
action in the pursuit of equitable resource management.  
 To underline the point, the critiques of 'fame-seeking' activists are socially important. 
These critiques underscore subtexts of social discord that are set within the wider cultural 
politics of dam building, and of development more broadly. That these critiques exist does 
not, however, mean that they are always accurate or merited. When writing about the 
internationally known campaigns against dams on the Narmada River, for instance, Amita 
Baviskar reminds us that movements very often have to rely on people with 'celebrity' appeal 
in order to make the demands of the movement known.64 Whether that activist is Medha 
Patkar or Arundhati Roy (in the case of the movements against dams on the Narmada) or 
Sunderlal Bahuguna and Dr. G.D. Agarwal (in the case of the movements against dams on 
the Ganga), these high-profile activists can force significant attention to important issues. At 
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times, the 'skewedness in coverage' of these celebrity platforms is something that the 
movements choose to accept 'as a means of attracting metropolitan supporters to their 
cause.'65 This is part of a phenomena that Dan Brockington has explored in various 
conservation-based conflicts that capitalise on the fame and popular appeal of a well-known 
celebrity who may or may not have a full grasp of the competing claims and interests of the 
various stakeholders involved in the conflict.66 An underlying driver of this phenomena, of 
course, is the media demand for flashy news bites. As Baviskar cautions, the discourses that 
appeal to the media, and to the masses that consume it, often favour 'glamour more than 
substance'.67 This can mean that certain leaders are caught in the bind of having the ability to 
make an impact on a movement's visibility while also risking accusations of selfish 
motivation and fame-seeking pursuits. These observations, nonetheless, leave room to 
appreciate the discursive and ideological hybridity that movements produce, as well as 'the 
ways in which the tensions and contradictions between different, unequal groups are 
negotiated.'68 In the course of such investigations, we can uncover the cultural politics of 
resource conflict along with the cultural politics produced by social movement processes. 
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